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The basic idea of federal preemp-tion is easily stated: It is a con-stitutionally mandated principle 
that demands that federal law trumps 
state law when the two confl ict or in 
the rare instances when a federal law is 
so comprehensive that there’s no role 
left for state law to fi ll. But in practice, 
courts have often had diffi culty applying 
the principle.
For plaintiff lawyers, preemption is 
an ever-present worry. When your cli-
ent has been injured by a defective car, 
truck, medical device, boat, tobacco 
product, pesticide, or mislabeled drug, 
or has been victimized by a bank or 
other lending institution, the defendant 
will probably assert that federal law pre-
empts your client’s state law damages 
claim. You can expect this argument no 
matter how weak the federal regulatory 
scheme or how attenuated the connec-
tion between that scheme and the harms 
your client suffered or the state law 
duties under which your client seeks a 
remedy.1
But defendants’ and tort “reformers’” 
pro-preemption arguments do not refl ect 
current preemption doctrine as estab-
lished by the courts. A common—and 
false—argument for preemption, for ex-
ample, is that state tort law necessarily 
interferes with federal regulatory objec-
tives.
Moreover, preemption of state tort 
law is a bad idea. Immunizing the mak-
ers of products that cause injury simply 
because, for instance, these products 
have been approved for marketing by a 
federal agency harms both the injured 
people and society generally.
An unsound theory
The theoretical basis that defendants 
offer for preemption of state tort law 
is not fi rmly established in preemption 
doctrine. I don’t mean the detailed com-
parison between a particular federal reg-
ulatory regime and the state tort claims 
asserted in a particular case. There, as 
the case law shows, the devil is in the 
details.2 I am referring to defendants’ ef-
forts to equate the effect of tort law—of 
seeking damages on the ground that the 
plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the 
device’s defective design or inadequate 
labeling is also preempted.
In other words, is the effect of posi-
tive law (in this case, a state’s positive 
law requirement that a product not be 
marketed) the same as a jury’s damag-
es verdict (in this case, a state’s award 
of damages based on a design defect)? 
This is an important question because 
defendants have relied heavily on the 
argument that positive law and com-
mon law damages exert the same regu-
latory effect and that when positive law 
is preempted, common law should be as 
well.
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proponents are wrong
Corporate defendants’ claim that the effect of state tort actions is equivalent to 
state positive law has no merit. The reality is that consumer protection can be 
guaranteed only when tort remedies work in tandem with federal regulation.
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Defendants have relied heavily on the argument 
that positive law and common law damages exert 
the same regulatory effect and that when positive 
law is preempted, common law should be as well.
state law damages actions—with posi-
tive state regulation.
For example, assume that a fed-
eral agency has approved the market-
ing of a particular medical device as it 
is currently designed, manufactured, 
and labeled and that a state’s ban on 
the marketing of this device would be 
preempted on the ground that it would 
confl ict with federal law. The question, 
then, is whether a state law tort suit 
Does the Supreme Court buy into 
this equivalence between positive state 
regulation and a jury’s award of damag-
es? To put it mildly, the Court has been 
unpredictable.
Its fi rst statement on this topic was 
in the labor law context, in San Diego 
Building Trades Council v. Garmon.3 
Garmon involved a business’s attempt 
to prevent union picketing by bringing a 
suit under California law seeking an in-
junction and damages. In an early stage 
of the litigation, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the injunctive relief was preempted 
by the National Labor Relations Act.4 
The Court also rejected the attempt to 
impose damages under California law:
[State] regulation can be as effectively 
exerted through an award of damages as 
through some form of preventive relief. 
The obligation to pay compensation can 
be, indeed is designed to be, a potent 
method of governing conduct and control-
ling policy. Even the states’ salutary effort 
In 1992, the Court seemed to change 
course. A plurality opinion in the fa-
mous tobacco liability case, Cipollone 
v. Liggett Group, Inc., relied on the 
language from Garmon quoted above 
and concluded that the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which 
requires specifi c warnings on cigarette 
packages, preempted some, but not all, 
tort claims based on a failure to warn 
about the dangers of smoking.8
This section of the Cipollone deci-
sion was premised in part on particular 
to warn.
In responding to the tobacco in-
dustry’s arguments that the 1965 act 
preempted state law damages claims 
based on the industry’s failure to warn, 
the Court seemed to reject the Garmon 
viewpoint as a general, overarching jus-
tifi cation for preemption: “[T]here is no 
general, inherent confl ict between feder-
al preemption of state warning require-
ments and the continued vitality of state 
common law damages actions.”11
The internal tension in Cipollone 
carried over to a 1996 medical device 
preemption case, Medtronic v. Lohr.12 
A plurality opinion, again authored by 
Justice Stevens, suggested that a ratio-
nal Congress could (and did) treat state 
common law damages actions differ-
ently from positive state law,13 while the 
dissenters and one concurring justice 
generally equated the two.14
Divining congressional 
intent
Although the Supreme Court’s con-
fusion on this score runs deep, it is im-
portant to mention three rulings from 
the Court that directly challenge the 
premise that positive law and damages 
liability are the same for preemption 
purposes. First, in Goodyear Atomic 
Corp. v. Miller, the Court considered 
whether an Ohio administrative agency 
could, consistent with federal preemp-
tion principles, award additional work-
ers’ compensation benefi ts based on 
violations of state safety standards at 
a federally owned, privately operated 
nuclear production facility.15
The Court held that the additional 
award was not preempted. Acknowledg-
ing that state positive law safety require-
ments might be preempted, the Court 
viewed damages liability as fundamen-
tally different:
Congress’ reluctance to allow direct state 
regulation of federal projects says little 
about whether Congress was likewise 
concerned with the incidental regulatory 
effects arising from the enforcement of a 
workers’ compensation law, like Ohio’s, 
that provides an additional award when the 
injury is caused by the breach of a safety 
regulation. The effects of direct regula-
tion on the operation of federal projects 
are signifi cantly more intrusive than the 
The Supreme Court has said it is ‘perfectly rational’ 
for Congress to preempt state positive law but not 
common law claims, which ‘perform an important 
remedial role in compensating accident victims.’
to redress private wrongs or grant com-
pensation for past harm cannot be exerted 
to regulate activities that are potentially 
subject to the exclusive federal regulatory 
scheme.5
Garmon was not a products liability 
case, and federal labor laws, unlike most 
federal statutes that regulate consumer 
products and services, authorize mone-
tary remedies. Garmon thus presented a 
different situation from the medical de-
vice example above because neither the 
relevant federal regulatory statute nor 
any other federal law provides a means 
to compensate people harmed by medi-
cal devices.6
Nevertheless, it is easy to see why 
preemption-seeking defendants rely so 
heavily on Garmon. Its exclusive focus 
on tort damages as a regulatory, rather 
than a compensatory, tool is useful to 
defendants seeking to equate positive 
law with tort law.
But Garmon arose in a context quite 
different from modern tort law, and even 
after Garmon, the prevailing assumption 
in the courts was that regulatory stan-
dards and state compensation schemes 
occupied separate spheres.7 Indeed, until 
the 1990s, the Supreme Court had never 
held a state law tort claim preempted 
by federal regulation, at least not where 
federal law itself did not provide a right 
of action for damages.
language of the 1969 act that purported-
ly pointed in the direction of preemption 
of common law duties.9 But it also relied 
on Garmon’s claim that damages liabil-
ity can have, and is intended to have, the 
same effect on the defendant’s future 
conduct as would positive state regula-
tion. Since then, defendants in products 
liability and similar cases have relied on 
this language from Garmon and Cipol-
lone ad nauseam, in an effort to show 
that state tort law and state positive law 
have the same regulatory effect—that is, 
that they are inherently the same.
But not so fast. In the majority por-
tion of the Cipollone decision—which 
addressed the preemptive effect of an 
earlier version of the cigarette-labeling 
law (the 1965 Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act)—just a few 
paragraphs above the endorsement of 
Garmon, the same justice who wrote 
the plurality opinion, Justice John Paul 
Stevens, said something quite different: 
that the 1965 act, because of its particu-
lar wording, preempts “only positive 
enactments by legislatures or adminis-
trative agencies that mandate particular 
warning labels” and “not . . . common 
law damages actions.”10 The Court held 
that although the 1965 act preempted 
state positive law labeling requirements, 
it did not preempt any state damages ac-
tions, even those premised on a failure 
incidental regulatory effects of such an ad-
ditional award provision. [The] appellant 
may choose to disregard Ohio safety regu-
lations and simply pay an additional work-
ers’ compensation award if an employee’s 
injury is caused by a safety violation. We 
believe Congress may reasonably deter-
mine that incidental regulatory pressure is 
acceptable, whereas direct regulatory au-
thority is not.16
The last sentence, which suggests 
that Congress had thought about the dif-
ferences between “incidental regulatory 
pressure” and “direct regulatory author-
ity,” seems a misstatement. Like most 
federal regulatory statutes—even those 
that expressly preempt state law—the 
statutes relevant in Goodyear Atomic 
had said nothing about preemption of 
state law monetary liability. In reality, 
the Court was saying that positive law 
and damages liability do not exert the 
same regulatory effect and that a reason-
able Congress, if it had thought about 
the question, would not have equated 
the two in confronting the issue present-
ed by the case.
Nor can the Garmon formulation be 
squared with two more-recent Supreme 
Court forays into tort preemption. In 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, which 
considered a preemption argument 
based on the Federal Boat Safety Act 
(FBSA), a young woman died tragically 
when she fell overboard and was struck 
by a boat’s propeller blades.17 One of the 
questions the case presented was wheth-
er a state common law claim premised 
on a boat manufacturer’s failure to in-
stall a propeller guard was preempted 
by the FBSA’s express preemption pro-
vision—which, according to the manu-
facturer, preempted all positive law and 
common law regarding boat safety.
The Court rejected that argument. It 
noted that it is “perfectly rational” for 
Congress to preempt state positive law 
but not “common law claims, which—
unlike most administrative and legisla-
tive regulations—necessarily perform 
an important remedial role in compen-
sating accident victims.”18
This statement is important because, 
generally, even when the Court has re-
fused to fi nd tort claims preempted and 
has challenged the notion that tort law 
exerts the same regulatory effect as pos-
itive law, it has not expressly touted tort 
law’s remedial function. And tort law’s 
ability to compensate the injured is one 
way that tort law and positive adminis-
trative law requirements differ funda-
mentally.
Finally, in Bates v. Dow Agrosci-
ences, a 2005 case about whether the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act preempts state tort claims, 
the Court overruled the pro-preemption 
position of nearly every federal circuit 
and about 30 state appellate courts.19 
The Court confronted an express pre-
emption provision that preempts state 
law “requirements” when they differ 
from, or add to, federal regulatory re-
quirements.20 In holding that most (and 
possibly all) of the plaintiff’s claims 
were not preempted, the Court ex-
plained that a positive law “requirement 
is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an 
event, such as a jury verdict, that merely 
motivates an optional decision, is not a 
requirement.”21 The Court was making 
the point that positive regulation has a 
much more direct effect on conduct than 
does a damages award.
Why are these cases important? Be-
cause if the basic theoretical justifi ca-
tion for preemption—equating state 
positive law and state tort law—is not 
really a part of the legal landscape, then 
defendants have only two things on 
protector of its citizens’ health and safe-
ty.23
In short, once the overarching justifi -
cation for tort preemption is gone, pre-
emption proponents must come up with 
some other, more case-specifi c, justifi -
cation. They no longer have a knockout 
punch.
A typical express preemption provi-
sion goes something like this: Preemp-
tion occurs where a state law “require-
ment” confl icts with a federal positive 
law “requirement.”24 That language, 
standing alone, doesn’t tell the courts 
much about whether state tort law is or 
is not preempted. If anything, because 
the federal law “requirement” is indis-
putably a positive regulatory require-
ment, it makes sense to think of the state 
law “requirement” as being one of posi-
tive law as well.25
And these ambiguous provisions sit 
smack-dab in the middle of statutes en-
acted in the 1960s and 1970s to improve 
consumer safety and health or fi nancial 
security, such as the Medical Device 
Amendments or the National Traffi c 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to name 
but two. And those statutes contain not 
a word—not a single word—suggesting 
that what Congress was really doing was 
enacting massive tort “reform” more ex-
pansive than the express tort “reform” 
statutes that Congress has been repeat-
To the extent that tort law exerts regulatory effect 
on a drug maker, it does so only after repeated suits, 
settlements, and fi ndings of liability; even then 
the cause-and-effect relationship is rarely clear.
which to hang their hats: highly ambigu-
ous express preemption provisions cre-
ated by Congresses that were striving to 
increase protections for consumers, or, 
even less plausibly, claims of implied 
preemption arising from the interstices 
of federal law.22
Neither of these assertions should 
fare well if the courts consistently ap-
ply the presumption against preemption 
of state law, which is said to apply with 
particular force in tort cases because of 
the state’s traditional role as the prime 
edly unwilling to enact over the last 20 
years.26
Let’s take one possible illustration of 
such a claim’s implausibility. Is it pos-
sible that the Medical Device Amend-
ments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act27—sponsored by Sen. Edward Ken-
nedy (D-Mass.) and passed in 1976 by 
an overwhelmingly Democratic post-
Watergate Congress in response to 
medical device tragedies such as the 
Dalkon Shield saga28—were intended to 
eliminate the right to recover under state 
law for injuries caused by defective 
FDA-approved medical devices? Some 
people may believe that tort preemption 
is a good thing, but they can’t seriously 
believe that it arises from an enactment 
like the Medical Device Amendments.
As Kennedy bluntly put it, “The leg-
islation is written so that the benefi t of 
the doubt is always given to the con-
sumer. After all, it is the consumer that 
pays with his health and life for medical 
device malfunctions.”29
duct of the regulated industry.
Contrast that direct regulatory power 
with the tort system. Large industry play-
ers generally react slowly, and some-
times not at all, to liability pressures. 
Most instances of liability are absorbed 
without a change in the manufacturer’s 
conduct, or at least the kind of change 
that a regulator could bring about swift-
ly. As the District of Columbia Circuit 
has recognized, the imposition of dam-
ages liability does not legally compel the 
has a nonregulatory component—com-
pensation—that is virtually never a 
component of the U.S. administrative 
law system. To put it another way, feder-
al agencies that regulate virtually never 
compensate.
Unfortunately, much modern preemp-
tion doctrine and many legal academics, 
intrigued by the theoretical regulatory 
effect of tort as a means of social con-
trol, have not focused on the compensa-
tory component. Yet the principal pur-
pose of tort law—particularly in a world 
where, at least in theory, the agencies 
are already accomplishing their regula-
tory function—is compensation.
Compensation is what distinguishes 
the tort system from the modern regula-
tory state. That is not to say that the cre-
ation and perpetuation of tort duties are 
not intended to have an effect on future 
conduct. They are. But, at the very least, 
regulatory control and compensation 
are major goals of tort law. That being 
so, why should the compensation prin-
ciple give way to the regulatory prin-
ciple when there is a perceived “regula-
tory” confl ict between tort law and the 
administrative state? And why shouldn’t 
the plaintiff’s interest in compensation 
prevail, particularly given the current 
political reality, in which federal law 
provides neither comprehensive health 
care nor accident insurance?
Given these political defi ciencies and 
the relatively weak regulatory effect of 
tort, the compensation principle should 
trump the regulation principle, at least 
in the absence of the most direct types 
of confl ict between federal law and state 
law (for instance, where federal law for-
bade boat propeller guards, and the state 
law tort claim was premised on a duty 
to provide one,34 or where federal law 
prohibited air bags, and the state law tort 
claim was premised on a duty to require 
them35). In this regard, one conception 
of strict products liability—in which 
the law acknowledges that even social-
ly benefi cial products can cause grave 
harm and allows those products on the 
market but compensates those who are 
injured—is perfectly consistent with a 
regulatory system that seeks, but can 
never fully achieve, optimal health and 
safety benefi ts.36
Even those inside the FDA have raised serious 
questions about the agency’s ability to achieve its 
mission.  FDA employees have expressed alarm at 
the improper pressure they felt to approve drugs.
A practical question
The doctrinal playing fi eld regarding 
preemption is therefore wide open. The 
next question, then, is a practical one: 
Does equating positive law with tort 
law work as a practical matter? In other 
words, does the equation make empiri-
cal sense? That’s an easy one, and the 
answer is no.
As a matter of regulatory impact, it 
is a huge leap from the proposition that 
tort law is meant to (and does to some 
degree) have a regulatory effect, to the 
proposition that its impact is equivalent 
to direct, positive law regulation.
When the FDA, for instance, wants to 
get a food, drug, or device off the mar-
ket, it can do so swiftly. It can actually 
seize products, like David Kessler did 
with misbranded orange juice when he 
fi rst became FDA commissioner.30 It can 
deny regulatory approval; it can impose 
advertising restrictions; it can demand 
data. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act gives industries the right to oppose 
agency action, but as a practical matter, 
the agency generally can exert its posi-
tive law priorities with great force.
Of course, agencies often do not 
exercise their full regulatory authority 
because of indifference, insuffi cient re-
sources, lack of political will, or “cap-
ture” by the regulated industry.31 But 
federal agencies, if they wish to do so, 
have the ability to quickly alter the con-
defendant to alter its future conduct.32
To the extent that tort law exerts a 
regulatory effect on a drug manufac-
turer, it does so only after repeated suits, 
settlements, and fi ndings of liability—
and even then the cause-and-effect rela-
tionship is rarely clear. In many instanc-
es, even after an onslaught of lawsuits, 
the manufacturer holds out for a long 
time—or forever. The Supreme Court 
put this well in Goodyear Atomic, when 
it said that “the effects of direct regula-
tion on the operation of federal projects 
are signifi cantly more intrusive than the 
incidental regulatory effects of such an 
additional award provision.”33
Of course, there is some symbiosis 
here. The regulatory system exerts pres-
sures on the tort system and vice versa, 
both exert fi nancial and political pres-
sure on politicians and industry, and 
both are capable of publicizing informa-
tion that would otherwise stay locked 
away in corporate fi le cabinets. But that 
doesn’t alter the basic truth: There is no 
reason to build a body of legal literature 
and judicial doctrine on the equivalency 
between tort and direct regulation when 
that equivalency is not remotely accu-
rate.
Compensatory role
Against this background, there are 
two reasons why tort preemption is gen-
erally a bad idea. First, the tort system 
The regulatory system is not intend-
ed to prevent all harm, nor could it—and 
this is the second reason why preemp-
tion is generally a bad idea. Regulation 
is meant to balance risks and benefi ts 
(with the knowledge that injuries will 
occur) in a highly imperfect system, 
where regulators depend almost ex-
clusively on profi t-motivated sellers to 
submit all available, relevant data—data 
that changes over time, as new informa-
tion emerges after a product is marketed 
to the public.
Even if we assume that tort law ex-
erts some regulatory pressure—and I 
do—why wouldn’t we want it to do so? 
The Supreme Court itself has seemed 
to answer that question affi rmatively, 
understanding both that tort law does 
not exert the same regulatory effect as 
positive law and that it can apply use-
ful pressure where the regulatory system 
fails to achieve its full purposes.37
A present-day example helps il-
lustrate the serious concerns raised by 
a system that would tolerate both tort 
preemption and regulatory failure. In a 
regulatory preamble accompanying a 
new FDA rule concerning drug labeling, 
the agency has claimed that its labeling 
rules preempt state tort claims based on 
a drug manufacturer’s failure to warn.38
In other words, the agency maintains 
that the principal type of state law dam-
ages claim raised by people injured by 
drugs has been silently obliterated by 
federal law—silently, because no fed-
eral statute or regulation remotely sug-
gests such a result. As a legal matter, the 
FDA’s view seems like a stretch for a 
host of reasons, not the least of which is 
that when Congress was considering the 
legislation that became the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act in 1938—the legis-
lation that authorizes the FDA to issue 
labeling rules in the fi rst place—it “re-
jected a provision in a draft of the origi-
nal (FDCA) providing a federal cause of 
action for damages because ‘a common 
law right of action [already] exists.’”39 
As my colleague Allison Zieve and I 
have elsewhere explained, the FDA’s 
preemption position has no legal support 
and is not entitled to judicial deference.40
My point for present purposes is not 
to undermine the FDA’s legal claim to 
preemption, but to show why preemp-
tion would do violence to public safety 
and to the agency’s mission. To put it 
mildly, the FDA’s preemption plea is ill-
timed. Recently, two independent gov-
ernment reports have described the dan-
gerous shortcomings in FDA oversight 
of drug safety.
First, in a report issued in March 
2006, the Government Accountability 
Offi ce concluded that the
FDA lacks clear and effective processes 
for making decisions about, and provid-
ing management oversight of, postmarket 
safety issues. The process has been limited 
by a lack of clarity about how decisions 
are made and about organizational roles, 
insuffi cient oversight by management, and 
data constraints.41
And more recently, a National Acad-
emies Institute of Medicine report, 
prepared at the FDA’s request, found 
that the drug safety system is impaired 
by “serious resource constraints that 
weaken the quality and quantity of the 
science that is brought to bear on drug 
safety; an organizational culture in [the 
FDA] that is not optimally functional; 
and unclear and insuffi cient regulatory 
authorities particularly with respect to 
enforcement.”42
propriately exclude or alter technical in-
formation or my conclusions in an FDA 
scientifi c document.”44
Similarly, in a 2003 survey by the 
FDA’s parent agency, the Department 
of Health and Human Services, 18 per-
cent of FDA physicians and scientists 
who responded reported pressure to rec-
ommend that drugs be approved, even 
when they had reservations about the 
drugs’ safety, effectiveness, or quality, 
and 66 percent lacked confi dence that 
the agency “adequately monitors the 
safety of prescription drugs once they 
are on the market.”45
Rezulin, Lotronex, Celebrex, Vioxx, 
Zoloft, Prozac, and Accutane are among 
the many drugs that have required post-
approval labeling changes to add or 
strengthen warnings. Several were re-
moved from the market entirely.
The labeling changes were due, at 
least in part, to information and pressure 
derived from the tort system. As a 2002 
medical journal article noted, “Many 
serious [adverse drug reactions] are 
discovered only after a drug has been 
on the market for years. Only half of 
newly discovered serious [adverse drug 
reactions] are detected and documented 
in the Physicians’ Desk Reference [the 
The Supreme Court recognizes that tort law does 
not exert the same regulatory effect as a positive 
law and can apply useful pressure where the 
regulatory system fails to achieve its full purposes.
doctors’ drug-labeling bible] within sev-
en years after drug approval.”46
With all that said, do we really want 
to override the tort system? Do we real-
ly want a system where imperfect regu-
latory agencies, all too often infl uenced 
by the regulated industries, must do the 
job on their own, while those who are 
injured have no means of compensation? 
To ask those questions is to answer them.
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Even those inside the agency have 
raised serious questions about the FDA’s 
ability to achieve its mission. In two re-
cent surveys, FDA employees expressed 
alarm at the improper pressure they felt 
to approve new drugs.
In one survey, released by the Union 
of Concerned Scientists last summer, 
60 percent of FDA employees who re-
sponded knew of situations “where 
commercial interests have inappropri-
ately induced or attempted to induce the 
reversal, withdrawal, or modifi cation of 
FDA determinations or actions.”43 Eigh-
teen percent agreed that “I have been 
asked, for nonscientifi c reasons, to inap-
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